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Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic
Stakeholders: Re-conceptualizing the Means and
Ends of Anglo-American Corporate Governance in
the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis

Introduction: Corporate Governance in Crisis? An Opportunity to
Re-think the Ends and Means of Governance
“The business of business is business.”
– Milton Friedman1

“In its broadest sense, corporate governance is concerned with holding the
balance between economic and social goals and between individual and
communal goals. The governance framework is there to encourage the
efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the
stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the
interests of individuals, corporations and society.”
– Sir Adrian Cadbury2

© 2014 Zhong Xing Tan
*
Zhong Xing Tan, Sheridan Fellow, National University of Singapore, Faculty of Law
1. Widely attributed to Friedman, this well-known phrase may have been derived from a statement in his
book, which states, “there is one and only one social responsibility of business–to use its resources and engage
in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say,
engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud.” MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 133 (1962).
2. Sir Adrian Cadbury, Foreword to STIJN CLAESSENS, Corporate Governance and Development,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION (2003), http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/7fc17c0048a7e6dda8b7e
f6060ad5911/Focus_1_Corp_Governance_and_Development.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
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Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic Stakeholders
The recent global financial crisis has been described as a “perfect storm of
economic conditions.”3 In dissecting the anatomy of this disaster, commentators
have highlighted numerous factors, from global trade imbalances, to financial
market innovation, and the poverty of free market ideology.4 Amidst the discussion
of such macro-environment factors, attention has turned toward the key micro
factor in the crisis: the failure of corporate governance, and in particular the AngloAmerican model, to curb excessive risk-taking and protect the interests of the
financial system and wider economy.5 As Sullivan notes: “The current crisis can be
best understood as a crisis of governance rather than an inherent failure of markets
or capitalism itself.”6
The financial crisis thus compels us to re-examine current Anglo-American
paradigms of corporate governance across two key planes: i) the ends of corporate
governance – viz, for what purpose and in whose interests is the company governed,
and ii) the means of governance – whether the current mix of strategies involving
directors and shareholders is adequate. The central thrust of this thesis is that the
ends of governance must be expanded past maximizing shareholder value to include
the interests of financial and economic stability, and that the means of governance viz, the roles and responsibilities of directors and shareholders – must be recalibrated in the light of this larger objective. Broadly, this includes changes to
board composition, structure and duties; as well as increasing the responsibilities of
shareholders. Collectively, directors and shareholders are both to be seen as stewards
for the wider system’s stake in the company.
The balance of this discussion proceeds as follows. Part I argues that the ends of
corporate governance must be expanded to include the protection of the economic
and financial system (the “systemic stakeholder” model). The leading competitor of
this wider paradigm, the shareholder value maximization model, is first questioned,
before the systemic stakeholder model is justified on a risk-based model of
stakeholding. Part II proceeds to analyze how current corporate governance
mechanisms – the board of directors and shareholders – are insufficient to protect
the interests of systemic stakeholders, and explains how particular failures of board
composition, structure and duties, as well as a lack of shareholder responsibility,
were facilitative of the financial crisis. My critique is sensitive to the differences in
the US and UK models of corporate governance, yet will show how each is
3. Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum, Karessa L. Cain, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2009,
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ 1, 1 (Dec. 8, 2008), www.wlrk.com/docs/ThoughtsforDirectors2009.pdf.
4. See A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis, THE TURNER REVIEW, Mar. 2009, at 1, 11-14
(discussing issues contributing to the 2008 global financial crisis); see generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL:
FREE MARKETS AND THE SINKING OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2010) (same).
5. Suzanne Young & Vijaya Thyil, A Holistic Approach to Corporate Governance: Lessons from the Financial
Crisis and the Way Forward, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 365, 365 (William Sun, Jim Stewart, David Pollard eds., 2011).
6. Rodney Sullivan, Finance Briefing: The Crisis is One of Governance, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 2, 2009,
06:02 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/58109850-7f4f-11de-85dc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qhgaF21V.
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particularly deficient. Part III then suggests how corporate governance can be
reformed in order to safeguard the interests of systemic stakeholders against
excessive corporate risk-taking. These reforms include:
1. re-composing the board to emphasize competence as well as independence,
and enhancing diversity;
2. re-structuring the board to include new board structures and ideas of network
governance to facilitate integrated risk management;
3. re-invigorating board duties to encompass oversight responsibility for risk
management; and
4. re-conceiving the role of shareholders to emphasize responsibilities to
corporate stakeholders.
It is concluded that the financial crisis has offered an opportunity for a holistic reappraisal of the ends and means of Anglo-American corporate governance, one
which we must seize in order to ensure that our legal regimes and regulatory
structures remain dynamically relevant and responsive to the needs of our time.

I.

Re-thinking the Ends of Corporate Governance – Expanding the
Paradigm to Include Protection of Systemic Stakeholders

The goal of corporate governance should go beyond furthering the interests of
shareholders to include protecting the interests of systemic stakeholders.7 A systemic
stakeholder is a socio-economic actor who may not be immediately connected to
the company through its usual nexus of contracts (for example, employees,
suppliers and customers); but who nonetheless has extended connections to the
company (for example, financial firms via links such as payment and settlement
systems).8 Accordingly, the protection of systemic stakeholders equates to the
protection of the stability and sustainability of the economic and financial system,
its ability to facilitate and enhance economic processes, manage risks and absorb
shocks.9 In more tangible terms, it is thus proposed that corporate governance
mechanisms must go beyond only maximizing shareholder value to also minimizing
systemic risk –the risk that a company’s actions may have widespread negative
repercussions on other social and economic actors due to the interconnectedness
between the firm and the economy.10

7. See infra Part I.A and related notes.
8. James Bullard, Christopher J. Neely, and David C. Wheelock, Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A
Primer, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW, September/October Part 1 2009, 403 at 408, available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/09/09/part1/Bullard.pdf.
9. Eddy Wymeersch, Corporate Governance and Financial Stability 1 (Ghent Univ. Fin. Law Inst. Working
Paper No. 2008-11), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1288631.
10. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 202–04 (2008) (discussing systemic risk from
institutional and market perspectives).
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This section can be summarized as follows: firstly, I contrast the two main
paradigms of corporate governance – shareholder and stakeholder models,
demonstrating how they diverge on the question of “In whose interests should the
company be governed?” Secondly, I point out how the shareholder paradigm is
fundamentally flawed – its usual justifications based on agency, residual claimant
and ownership theories are mistaken; nor does the shareholder paradigm promote
economic efficiency – instead it may lead to short-termism and economic
instability; nor is the shareholder paradigm as ubiquitous as it is made out to be.
Thirdly, I justify the argument that corporate governance should protect the
interests of systemic stakeholders on a risk-based conception of stakeholding.
Further, I address four main objections to the systemic stakeholder paradigm – i)
that it applies only to financial firms and has no corporate governance implications
for non-financials, ii) that the protection of systemic stakeholders is the province of
other regulatory regimes apart from corporate governance, iii) that protection of
systemic stakeholders is far too broad and unverifiable an objective for corporate
governance, and iv) that the protection of systemic stakeholders mutually excludes
the pursuit of profit maximization and hence is damaging to the survival of the
firm. It is concluded that the ends of corporate governance – its raison d’être – must
include the protection of the economy and financial system.
A.

Paradigms of Corporate Governance: Shareholder versus Stakeholder Models

In whose interests should the company be governed? The two paradigmatic models
of corporate governance, shareholder value maximization and stakeholder theory,
provide sharply contrasting answers to this question. The shareholder-oriented view
holds that the corporation is formed from a nexus of private contracts, a private
entity whose primary purpose is to maximize shareholder wealth.11 The contrasting
view is stakeholder-oriented: positing that the company has both public and private
roles, thus behoving it to be managed in the interests of a broader range of
stakeholders, including employees, consumers, and the wider public.12
The polarities of these two paradigms of corporate governance are clearly
reflected in legal instruments as well - the UK Hampel Report of 1998 clearly tends
towards shareholder primacy, stating that: “[T]he importance of corporate
governance lies in its contribution both to business prosperity and to
accountability. . .But the emphasis on accountability has tended to obscure a
board’s first responsibility—to enhance the prosperity of the business over
time. . .”13 In contrast, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance state that

11. Virginia E. Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the ShareholderStakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L.J. 59, 71 (2010) (discussing stakeholders under corporate law).
12. Id.
13. Sally Wheeler, Board Composition and Female Non-Executive Directors, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION 272, 273 (Ian MacNeil & Justin O’ Brien eds., 2010).
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policy and regulation should provide firms with “incentives and discipline to
minimize the divergence between private and social returns and to protect the
interests of stakeholders.”14
B.

The Shareholder Value Maximization Paradigm Questioned

1. Agency and Residual Claimant Theories Do Not Solely Support Shareholder
Value Maximization
Agency Theory
One of the most common justifications for the idea that the company should be
governed solely in the interests of shareholders is agency theory, which starts with
the Berle-Means observation that as countries industrialize and develop their
markets, ownership and control of companies become separated. In the light of this
separation, owners (as principals) appoint managers (as agents) to control the
company on their behalf.15 However, as Jensen and Meckling point out, there are
conflicts of interest between the principals and agents, because managers would
want to act in their own self-interest by extracting benefits from the company or
pursuing self-aggrandizing projects16 Such opportunistic behaviour results in agency
costs to the company, which include the losses in corporate value to principals.17
Shareholder primacy theorists reason that the very purpose of corporate governance
law is to reduce such agency costs – viz, to protect the interests of vulnerable
principals against opportunistic agents. Accordingly, because shareholders are such
principals, corporate law should be geared towards promoting their interests.
The fallacy in the reasoning of shareholder primacy theorists lies not in the idea
that corporate governance mechanisms should protect the interests of principals
vis-à-vis agents – which is a correct insight; but that shareholders are the only
principals for whom corporate law should act. While the separation of ownership
and control undoubtedly creates one type of agency problem, multiple agency
problems can arise in the context of the company. As Alexander, Dhumale and
Eatwell point out, agency problems “arise because responsibility for decision
making is directly or indirectly delegated from one stakeholder group to another in
situations where stakeholder groups have different objectives and where complete
information that would allow the first group to exert control over the decision

14. MAGDI ISKANDER & NADEREH CHAMLOU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR
IMPLEMENTATION—OVERVIEW 4 (1999).
15. MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY, (1998); see also JEAN TIROLE, THE
THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 15 (2006) (discussing corporate governance and the separation of ownership
and control).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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maker is not readily available.”18 For example, agency problems regularly arise
between majority (controlling) shareholders as agents and minority (noncontrolling) shareholders as principals; or between controlling shareholders as
agents and non-controlling stakeholders as principals (such as creditors, employees
and customers).19 As such, shareholders are not the only vulnerable constituency
which corporate law must protect. Recently, the economic system has itself been
recognized as one such vulnerable principal – because excessive risk-taking by the
company can impose wider agency costs (or “negative externalities”) on society in
the form of economic losses, financial destabilization, and more intangible
repercussions on the social fabric.20
Residual Claimant Theory
The shareholder primacy theorist might further buttress her argument by
contending that shareholders are not simply vulnerable principals; but that they are
a unique type of principals: residual claimants. According to this theory, the
company should be governed solely in the interests of shareholders because they
alone have a financial stake in the company not protected by explicit contracts (a
“residual interest”). Unlike employees and creditors whose interests are explicitly
protected by contract, the shareholders’ dividend depends on the company’s
success, and they alone bear risks from discretionary decisions made by the
company.21
The assumption that shareholders are the sole residual claimants of the firm has
been pointed out to be false. Firstly, commentators have highlighted the existence of
implicit contracts, where other stakeholders such as employees make firm-specific
investments that are not necessarily protected by formal contracts, such as where a
company enters into an implicit understanding with its employees that a good faith
effort will be made to pay out significant bonuses in addition to lower fixed wages.22
Another example from continental Europe is where employees are implicitly
promised certain monetary benefits upon the termination of their contracts.23 In
such cases, employees have financial stakes in the company that depend on the
value of the firm, which are unprotected by contract – thus they bear the risks of

18. KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE, JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 243 (2006).
19. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 35-36 (2d ed. 2009).
20. Richard W. Painter, Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Reflections on an Evolving Standard: Constraints on Risk
Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United States, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1433, 1450-51 (2010).
21. Bernard S. Sharfman, Enhancing the Efficiency of Board Decision Making: Lessons Learned From The
Financial Crisis of 2008, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 813, 827–28 (2009).
22. Id. at 828.
23. J. Matthijs de Jongh, Are Shareholders the Only Residual Claimants?, THE DEFINING TENSION (Dec. 7,
2009), http://www.thedefiningtension.com.
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bad corporate decisions. In the context of the financial crisis, another group of
residual claimants has been identified: the wider public, which does not have its
interest in economic stability protected by any form of legal contract and has to
incur the costs to the economy of excessive risk-taking by bailing out
dysfunctionally-governed corporations such as AIG, to the tune of over US$180
billion worth of issued loans and guarantees on AIG debt and derivatives
contracts.24 Given that the public’s finances are directly affected by the failure of
systemically-linked companies, residual claimant theory would likewise
countenance taking the interests of the economy into account.

2.

The Ownership Concept of Shareholding is Misleading

Another justification for the company to be governed in the interests of
shareholders is the common perception that shareholders own the company. The
company itself is seen as a species of private property, capable of being owned.25
Analogizing from proprietary concepts, Eisenberg has argued that shareholders
possess most incidents of ownership, for example the “rights to possess, use, and
manage, and the rights to income and to capital.”26 In contrast, while creditors,
customers, suppliers and the wider public may have various rights and interests in
the company, they do not have the same measure of proprietary interest; hence their
interests are permanently subordinated to that of shareholders.27
The assumption that shareholders are owners, whose interests the company
should solely take into account, is highly questionable – albeit intuitively appealing
and deeply-rooted. Bainbridge points out that what shareholders own is stock,
which represents but a proportionate claim on the company’s net assets in the event
of liquidation; the right to a pro rata share of dividends subject to declaration by the
board of directors; and limited electoral rights.28 Importantly, shareholders’
ownership of stock does not entitle them to use or possesses corporate property,
irrespective of whether the shareholder has a majority or minority interest, or
whether shareholders are acting individually or collectively.29
Further, Ireland and Sealy have emphasized that shareholder ownership is a legal
fiction that is far out of touch with the economy reality of how shareholders operate
in modern day capital markets.30 Shareholders today largely hold a diversified basket
of securities as passive investors “standing outside the company and the production
24. JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN THE AGE OF
FINANCIAL CAPITALISM 3–4 (2010).
25. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 234–36 (2012).
26. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature
of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 825 (1999).
27. Id.
28. See Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 234-36.
29. Id.
30. Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership, 62 MOD. L. REV. 32, 33 (1999).

Vol. 9, No. 2 2014

175

TAN (DO NOT DELETE)

4/1/2014 5:11 PM

Stewardship in the Interests of Systemic Stakeholders
process.”31 In comparison with debenture holders, for example, while their legal
characteristics may seem distinguishable (debenture holders having rights to being
repaid with interest; while shareholders having rights to dividends), the economic
reality is that both are treated as securities in the corporate sector of the economy
offering different kinds of risks and returns.32 Shareholders, like debenture holders,
are simply “money capitalists. . .[d]isinterested and uninvolved in management,
and, in any case largely stripped (in law as well as in economic reality) of genuine
corporate ownership rights.”33
Finally, the idea of shareholding as ownership falls prey to a common mistake in
reasoning - what Bainbridge terms the “reification” fallacy.34 Behind the fiction of
legal personality, a company is not a thing capable of being owned or a mere
collection of assets; but an aggregate of “relationships between the people who have
various stakes in the enterprise”,35 including, inter alia, shareholders who provide
initial equity capital, creditors who provide debt capital, and employees who
provide labour. It would be fallacious to reason that this set of relationships,
commonly described as a nexus or web of explicit and implicit contractual
relationships, is reducible to an object of property.36 Reification – treating an
abstraction as the real thing – is a semantically-useful shorthand for attributing
responsibility in both common parlance and in law; but on the other hand, it
unhelpfully obscures the reality that shareholders are but one set of stakeholders in
a complex web of interconnected relationships that make up the company.37

3.

Shareholder Value Maximization Can Exacerbate Short-termist Pressures and Is
Not Always Economically Desirable

It has been contended that the shareholder value maximization model is the most
economically-desirable model of corporate governance. Hansmann and Kraakman,
in their influential, albeit controversial, article “The End of History for Corporate
Law”, argue that countries such as America, which adopted the shareholder
primacy model, have shown much stronger economic performance than countries
that tend towards other models, such as German and French economies, which
tend towards a more stakeholder-oriented view.38 Further, they assert that
shareholder-oriented models have competitive advantages over firms adhering to
31. Id. at 42.
32. Id. at 47.
33. Id.
34. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 25, at 235. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in
Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 776 (2006).
35. Id. at 234–36.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 235.
38. Henry Hansmaan & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 450
(2001).
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other models because they can access equity capital at a lower cost, enabling them
to penetrate new product markets more quickly, leading to greater economic
returns in aggregate social welfare.39
These assertions, made in 2000, have been left bare in the wake of the 2009
financial crisis, which has demonstrated that a shareholder-centric view can lead to
short-termist corporate strategies, which are ultimately destabilizing for the entire
economy. As Cioffi notes: “One of the troubling paradoxes [of the financial crisis] is
that pro-shareholder legal reforms adopted throughout the world intensified the
incentives for short-termism, excessive risk taking, and managerial rent seeking.40
The crisis could not have become so devastating if corporate governance regimes
had effectively protected and promoted the long-term interests of the shareholders
and stakeholders.”41 Indeed, shareholders are seen to have precipitated the crisis
rather than being unfortunate victims of it.42
To elaborate, the problems with shareholder-centrism began in the later part of
the 20th century, with the rise of what commentators call “financial capitalism” – the
increasing role of financial markets, actors, institutions and motives in the
operation of the domestic and international economy.43 With financialization, a
new set of shareholders entered the scene and began to influence corporate
governance – institutional investors such as pension funds and retail funds, and
investors with short-term time horizons such as hedge funds and private equity.44
These investors were less concerned with long-term value maximization of
particular firms than with maximizing the earnings of a basket of securities
denoting equity or debt interests in various companies. This financial motivation
drove the expansion of stock markets and the creation of new financial products
used for speculative investment, where capital markets would allow quick entry and
exit into the equity interest of a firm, regardless of what it might entail for the longterm health of any one company.45 For example, in 2006, shares of NYSE-listed
companies turned over at a rate of 118% - every share of stock being traded on
average at least once during that year, an evident sign of speculation.46 The support
39. Id. at 450–51.
40. CIOFFI, supra note 24, at 206.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Charlotte Villiers, Has the Financial Crisis Revealed the Concept of the ‘Responsible Owner’ to Be
a Myth?, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 287 (Iain MacNeil & Justin O’Brien eds., 2010) (questioning
whether shareholders bear responsibility for the financial crisis because “they could have been more diligent,
supervised [their] agents better, and ensured that executive remuneration reflected real performance and longterm thinking.”).
43. See MARKUS KALLIFATIDES ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN MODERN FINANCIAL CAPITALISM: OLD
MUTUAL’S HOSTILE TAKEOVER OF SKANDIA 4 (2010).
44. Id. at 5.
45. Nadelle Grossman, Short-Term Fling or Long-Term Commitment: Board Duties in a New Era,
BEPRESS.COM 7–8 (March 2009), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002 &context=nadelle_
grossman.
46. Id. at 8.
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given by shareholders to short-termist corporate strategies was enhanced by the fact
that governments (particularly in the US) gave implicit guarantees to large
companies which were “too big to fail” – thus shareholders would favour excessive
risk that increased potential returns because they discount losses that taxpayers
would potentially bear.47
The negative repercussions on the economy of short-termist strategies favoured
by shareholders are clearly demonstrated by the financial crisis. Shareholders of US
financial firms supported the acquisition of mortgage-backed securities (MBOs)
and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), securities whose payments derive from
mortgage loans and mixed pools of receivables, respectively.48 These investments
were tied to the short-term increase in housing prices rather than any sustainable
increase in long-term economic value. Once home prices plummeted in 2008,
borrowers defaulted on their loans - loans which backed the MBOs and CDOs such that financial firms lost much of the value of their assets.49 Unfortunately, these
losses were not isolated but had effects on the wider economy: credit markets began
to dry up, making it difficult for enterprises to acquire debt-financing, start-up
capital and R&D funding – the lifeblood of corporate growth.50 Without thriving
businesses, the ripple effects extended to increasing unemployment and lower
economic growth overall. This explication of the links between shareholdercentrism and the financial crisis thus demonstrates that governing the corporation
solely in the interests of shareholders is not always conducive to economic growth;
and as the crisis indicates, may in fact be inimical to sustainable economic
development.

4.

The Ubiquity of the Shareholder Value Maximization Model Is Questionable

One final argument for shareholder primacy is its ubiquity and inevitability.51
Hansmann and Kraakman famously assert that the shareholder-centric view
dominates business, government and legal elites in key commercial jurisdictions,
and that with the current emergent consensus, global convergence towards this
paradigm is inevitable, hence “the end of history for corporate law.”52
The first objection one might raise is that even if shareholder-centrism is the case
in reality, this does not mean that it should be the ideal paradigm of corporate
governance. Thus one may argue that Hansmann and Kraakman have attempted to
47. Tom Baker & David Moss, Government as Risk Manager, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 87, 94
(The Tobin Project et al. eds., 2009). See also Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 11.
48. Grossman, supra note 45, at 34.
49. Id. at 34–35. See also Stiglitz, supra note 4, at 14.
50. Stiglitz, supra note 4, at 27–28.
51. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 38, at 449–51 (contending that the shareholder-oriented model
achieved ubiquity because alternative models failed, and because the forces of logic, example, and competition
demonstrated its superiority).
52. Id. at 449–50.
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draw normative justification for the shareholder-centric paradigm from merely
descriptive premises, the fallacy of deriving an “is” from an “ought”.
Secondly, one can object that shareholder-centrism correctly reflects the reality
of corporate law as it stands in the world today. No small number of commentators
have accurately pointed out that explaining the state of corporate governance in a
one-dimensional paradigm is flawed, missing out on the diversity of corporate
governance paradigms across jurisdictions, such as the existence and persistence of
the German co-determination model which institutionally includes stakeholders
such as employees on the supervisory board.53 Further, as Puchniak observes, the
assumption of inevitability misses the fact that corporate governance “adapt[s] to fit
its ever-changing environment.”54 American corporate governance, the supposedly
paradigmatic example of shareholder-centrism, has in fact moved toward certain
aspects of the Japanese main bank model, for example with the rise of American
institutional shareholders who resemble Japanese stable shareholders under the
main bank model.55 Indeed, other aspects of US corporate governance indicate that
it has also adopted characteristics of a stakeholder-centric model. For example,
commentators note the rise of non-shareholder constituency statutes in at least
thirty states, which permit or require directors to consider the impact of their
decisions on non-shareholding stakeholders.56 Pennsylvania, for one, allows
directors to consider the effect of their decisions not just on shareholders, but on
“employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon
communities.”57 Such statutes are inconsistent with a pure shareholder primacy
norm and suggest a degree of stakeholder-orientation.
C.

The Systemic Stakeholder Model Justified

While we may effectively conclude that shareholder value maximization is not
supportable by agency, residual claimant, or ownership theories; and that it is not
economically desirable, nor ubiquitous and inevitable, we do need a justifiable
alternative paradigm. It is argued that this paradigm should be a systemic
stakeholder model, where the ends of corporate governance should go beyond
furthering the interests of shareholders to include the protection of the interests of
systemic stakeholders: socio-economic actors who may not be immediately

53. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or a Never-Ending Story?,
86 WASH. L. REV. 475, 489–90 (2011). See generally LAY HONG TAN ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF LISTED
COMPANIES IN SINGAPORE (2006).
54. Dan W. Puchniak, The Japanization of American Corporate Governance? Evidence of the Never-Ending
History for Corporate Law, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 69–70 (2007).
55. Id. at 25–33.
56. Antony Page, Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals for Reform, 107 MICH. L. REV. 979, 988
(2009). See also Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Financial Crisis: Impetus for Restoring Corporate Democracy,
2010 MIDWEST ACAD. LEGAL STUDIES IN BUS. 1, 10, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1529733.
57. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a)(1) (2013).
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connected to the company through its usual nexus of contracts but who nonetheless
have extended connections to the company.58 To put it another way, the goal of
corporate governance mechanisms must go beyond only maximizing shareholder
value to also minimizing systemic risk: the risk that a company’s actions may have
widespread negative repercussions on other socio-economic actors in the economic
or financial system.59

1.

The Financial System and Economy Qualify as Stakeholders Under a Risk-based
Model of Stakeholding

The basic idea of a “stakeholder” whose interests the company should take into
account was articulated as early as 1932 by E. Merrick Dodd Jr., who argued that a
company’s “[p]ower over the lives of others tends to create on the part of those
most worthy to exercise it a sense of responsibility”, and that this “sense of
responsibility toward employees, consumers, and the general public may thus come
to be regarded as the appropriate attitude to be adopted by those who are engaged
in business.”60 As Kershaw observes, Dodd’s basic insight is that large companies
will wield tremendous power and influence over the lives of all members of society,
whether in providing goods, services or employment, and accordingly, with this
power comes the responsibility to act in the wider interests of society.61
While Dodd’s basic insight has been refined subsequently by various theorists,62
one of the more compelling and influential conceptions is Max Clarkson’s riskbased model of stakeholding. According to Clarkson, the key to defining a stake in a
company is whether one has an economic interest at risk in the firm63 – thus this
includes, but is not limited to, shareholders (who risk the loss of their investment),
creditors (who risk default on their loans), and employees (who risk dismissal or
under-compensation). Because these actors have stakes in the company, they

58. Bullard, supra note 8, at 407–09.
59. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008).
60. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1157, 1160
(1932).
61. DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND MATERIALS 223 (2009).
62. For example, Evan and Freeman argue for a theory of ‘Kantian capitalism’, citing Kant’s notion that
people should be treated as an end and never a means, thus the welfare employees, consumers and the wider
public should equally be the ends of enterprise. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, ET AL., STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE
OF THE ART 214 (2010).
63. Specifically, Clarkson defines stakeholders as people who “bear some form of risk as a result of having
invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm.” Andrew Keay, Stakeholder
Theory in Corporate Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249, 259 (2010) (quoting Max
B. E. Clarkson, A Risk-based Model of Stakeholder Theory (The Ctr. for Corporate Soc. Performance and Ethics,
Working Paper, 1995)). See also Deborah Vidavier-Cohen, Taking a Risk: Max Clarkson’s Impact on Stakeholder
Theory, 38 BUS. & SOC’Y 39, 39 (1999), available at http://bas.sagepub.com/content/38/1/6.citation.
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therefore have claims on how it should allocate resources under its control.64
One of the key advantages of a risk-based conception is that it is neither overinclusive nor under-inclusive. Other theories which define a stakeholder as any
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the firm are subject to the
charge of being overbroad – based on such conceptions, even entities that have no
clearly identifiable interests such as the natural environment, would also be
considered a stakeholder.65 At the same time, it avoids being restricted to unduly
narrow definitions which include only those actors who have immediate and
contractual interactions with the company (for example, customers, suppliers and
employees).
Based on Clarkson’s risk model, one can reason that the financial system or
economy itself is a stakeholder in the company. For example, a large financial firm
is generally linked with the financial system through a web of financial relationships
and through its participation in capital markets.66 Because of these interconnections,
there exists the risk that losses to one firm will set in motion “a series of successive
losses along a chain of institutions or markets comprising a system.”67 This is known
as systemic risk – “the risk of a chain reaction of falling interconnected dominos.”68
For example, in the payments network, the Board of Governors of the US Federal
Reserve has emphasized that systemic risk can occur if a financial firm participating
in a payments network is unable to settle its net debt position, which would in turn
result in the institution’s creditors being unable to settle their commitments.69 This
ripple effect may extend even to depository institutions not participating in the
network, and to the real (non-financial) economy consequently.70 Thus, if risk is the
touchstone of stakeholding, it follows that systemic risk behoves the company to
take into account the interests of systemic stakeholders. In a particularly striking
metaphor, the ex-governor of the Bank of England, E.A.J. George, described the
fates of the company and the financial system as being “tie[d]. . .like mountaineers,
so that if one falls off the rock face others are pulled off too.”71

64. Keay, supra note 63, at 256 (“All those who contribute critical resources to the corporation should
benefit. So, rather than the corporation working to create value for shareholders, the stakeholder theory adheres
to the idea that the corporation works towards creation of value for all stakeholders. Furthermore, it is
fundamental to stakeholding that organisations are managed for the benefit of, and accountable to, all
stakeholders.”).
65. Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, The Ethical and Environmental Limits of Stakeholder Theory 12 BUSINESS
ETHICS QUARTERLY 215, 218 (2002).
66. Bullard, supra note 8, at 408.
67. George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or
Contribute to It? 7 INDEP. REV. 371, 372 n. 3 (2003).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Dodd, supra note 60, at 1156.
71. Kaufman & Scott, supra note 67, at 373.
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2.

Objection 1: Is the Systemic Stakeholder Model Relevant Only to Financial Firms?

One may counter that the above-mentioned argument - that the financial system
and economy are stakeholders - applies solely to financial firms. Hence, its
corporate governance implications are limited and this thesis should perhaps be
confined to the corporate governance of banking institutions. It is acknowledged
that the problem of systemic risk is especially acute in financial firms.72 As various
commentators have pointed out, the degree of interconnectedness within the
financial system is heightened because of interbank loan and deposit markets, and
payment and settlement systems.73 Heremans explains that “the banking system
contains powerful propagation mechanisms that can amplify small initial shocks as
they are much more interconnected than is the case in other sectors of the
economy.”74
Non-Financial Firms Undertaking Non-Financial Activities Can Also Present
Systemic Risks
However, to presume systemic risk is a problem only in the financial sector is
myopic – all large industrial and commercial companies pose some degree of risk to
the wider economic system were they to fail.75 Levitin gives the example of the
failure of a large aerospace manufacturer, which would cause losses not just to
counterparties such as parts suppliers and airlines that have paid in advance for
aircraft; but would have ripple effects on airlines’ ability to cater to the demand for
air travel, and the efficiency of global transportation as a whole.76 Similarly, the
failure of a large commercial company such as US.
Wal-Mart would result in massive economic dislocations, because Wal-Mart is
not only a major buyer of products from thousands of companies, but also creates
an entire value-chain of logistics businesses between manufacturers, warehouses,
and stores.77 Thus, non-financial firms which are strategically and systemically

72. Id.
73. Ross Levine, The Corporate Governance of Banks: A Concise Discussion of Concepts and Evidence 2
(Global Corporate Governance Forum, Paper No. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/
0fa1e18048a7e589a23fe76060ad5911/DP_3_CG_of_Banks_Levine_2003.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. See also, Andrea
Polo, The Corporate Governance of Banks: The Current State of the Debate 2 (Universitat Pompeu Fabra Faculty
of Economic and Business Sciences, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=958796 and Vasile Corcis &
Maria Cristina Ugureanu, Why are Banks Special? An Approach From the Corporate Governance Perspective 56
(University Iasi Economic Series, Paper No. 54, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090291.
74. Dirk Heremans, Corporate Governance Issues for Banks: A Financial Stability Perspective 5 (Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven Center for Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 07.07, 2007) available at
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/120504/1/Dps0707.pdf.
75. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L. J. 435, 453–54 (2011).
76. Id. at 353.
77. Id.
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important to fuelling the economic engine can be as vital to the economy as
financial institutions.
Non-Financial Firms May Act Like Financial Firms and thus Present Systemic Risks
Additionally, firms that may appear to be non-financial in nature (that is, nonbanking or insurance-type firms) are often plugged into the financial markets and
regularly participate in financial activities. A common example would be vehicle
manufacturers and major retailers which have affiliated sales and financing arms,
enabling them to undertake transactions such as credit-sales where the primary
element of the transaction – the sale – is accompanied by a financial intermediation
function.78 General Motors, while primarily involved in vehicle manufacturing, is
closely affiliated with Ally Financial (previously General Motors Acceptance
Corporation), which supports the manufacturing and sales arm of General Motors
by providing auto financing, insurance and mortgage services.79 Thus it is difficult
to draw the line between firms that are purely financial and those that are purely
commercial or industrial.80
Furthermore, such non-financials which undertake financial activities can
consequently present a huge systemic risk to the wider economy. Perhaps the most
egregious example of this is Enron. Enron, which began life as a transporter of
natural gas, subsequently desired to transform itself into a pure financial
intermediary where it would create a proprietary marketplace and match up energy
producers, carriers and users; as well as provide risk management products in the
form of derivative contracts which covered its customers’ exposure to price risks.81
Enron’s derivative business evolved into a speculative trading arm and was one of
the major sources of market and credit risk to the firm, placing bets on rising energy
prices which ultimately failed.82 Bratton explains that “Enron collapsed the same
way banks routinely collapsed in days before deposit insurance. It did so because it
had largely succeeded in realizing Skilling’s [the Enron CEO] vision of becoming a
financial institution.”83 Further, Enron’s interconnections with the entire energy
industry, financial markets and society (through employment and pensions) meant
that its excessive risk-taking threatened the wider economy. As Merson points out:
“[I]f Enron had continued to succeed making ever-rising profits by amoral
means. . .then shareholders’ interests may have been served with the denial of every
other conceivable interest as the company continued to hike prices by exercising
monopoly power, destabilising essential energy and other services, creating

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 454.
Id.
Id.
William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1288 (2002).
Id. at 1289.
Id. at 1360.
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volatility in markets that undermined the prospects of continuing normal business
in other industries, and damaging people’s lives as a result.”84 Thus, it is clear that
large interconnected non-financials which are significantly involved in financial
activities can present systemic risks.
Finally, the argument that all large companies - and not just financial institutions
- should be cognizant of risks to the system, derives additional support from
corporate governance reforms in the wake of the financial crisis, which generally
apply to large listed companies – whether or not they are financial institutions.85 For
example, although Sir David Walker’s initial mandate by the UK government was to
review the governance of banks and other financial institutions, the UK Financial
Reporting Council eventually imported substantial parts of the Walker
recommendations into its 2009 Review of the Combined Code of Corporate
Governance, emphasizing that the corporate governance implications from
financial institutions’ failures to manage systemic risk apply to non-financial
institutions as well.86
Thus, it is submitted that the systemic stakeholder model should apply to all
public listed companies, whether or not they are financial institutions. The basis for
excluding private and non-listed public companies is that these firms may vary
considerably in size, and thus their “too big to fail” potential may not always be
clear and present. On the other hand, public listed companies have to meet
minimum market capitalization standards – for example, the NYSE requires
US$150 million based on its “Assets and Equity” test for global market
capitalization.87 The size of the company thus serves as a fairly accurate proxy for its
economic presence, and accordingly, the potential risk it presents to the system
were it to collapse.

3.

Objection 2: Should Systemic Stakeholders be Protected by Regulatory Regimes
Other than Corporate Governance Law?
Some commentators agree that the interests of systemic stakeholders are important,
and that systemic risk should be reduced, but take the position that this objective is
not within the purview of corporate law. Corporate law should simply be a tool for
maximizing shareholder interests, while the separate objective of controlling risks to
the system can be achieved by putting in place banking or financial regulations,

84. RUPERT MERSON, RULES ARE NOT ENOUGH: THE ART OF GOVERNANCE IN THE REAL WORLD 101 (Profile
Books, LTD., 2010).
85. See generally, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE WAKE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1–39 (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development 2010), available at www.unctad.org/isar.
86. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, 2009 REVIEW OF THE COMBINED CODE: FINAL REPORT 10–11 (Dec.
2009).
87. U.S. Listing Standards, NYSE EURONEXT (Jan. 14, 2014, 3:31PM), http://usequities.nyx.com/regulation/
listed-companies-compliance/listings-standards/us.
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such as capital requirements.88 Along the same lines, Hansmann and Kraakman
have previously asserted a parallel position with respect to stakeholders such as
workers and consumers, who are allegedly protected by health and safety law, and
product liability law, respectively.89
This reasoning is fallacious because it assumes that banking or financial
regulations can completely curb risk to systemic stakeholders. For example, Gevurtz
points out that capital requirements to curb excessive risk work only to a limited
extent.90 Capital requirements, in the context of financial firms, are legal obligations
on firms to hold a certain amount of retained earnings, reserves, and amounts
received for common and preferred stock, as a percentage of the firm’s total assets –
in order to provide a cushion to insure that a firm can still meet its obligations to
depositors despite losses in its investment and lending portfolio.91 However, such
requirements only mitigate the consequences of excessive risk-taking, rather than
curbing risk-taking behaviour. In fact, capital requirements may in fact perversely
produce an incentive to take greater risks to ensure a higher return on investments,
since more capital is set aside to cushion possible losses.92 Furthermore, it is unclear
whether capital requirements are sufficient to meet obligations owed to creditors
(in the banking setting, depositors) given many investors’ short-term horizons,
which would predispose them toward risk-taking way in excess of capital cushions.
As Guvertz puts it: “The mathematics of banking is such that unless one makes the
capital requirement so large as to undercut the banking function altogether,
investments that are not in the interest of depositors still may make sense for the
shareholders despite the risk to capital. Compounding this problem is the fact that
the cost of a bank’s collapse may be systemic damage to the broader economy,
which could even exceed the depositors’ losses.”93
Furthermore, claiming that the problem of systemic risk is one of financial
regulation mistakenly conveys the impression that defective corporate governance
had no part to play in the financial crisis. Indeed, the root problem of excessive risktaking can be attributed to the behaviour of directors and shareholders, the
controlling agents of the company. As Kirkpatrick explains, lapses in board
oversight and risk management, not to mention remuneration structures which
incentivized short-termism, were major contributing factors to the crisis.94 It follows

88. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing a Financial Crisis: Reflections on In re
Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation 23 GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 113, 123 (2010).
89. Hansmann, supra note 38, at 442.
90. Gevurtz, supra note 88, at 123.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 125.
94. Grant Kirkpatrick, THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 (OCED
Steering Group on Corporate Governance, 2009).
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that where failures in corporate governance contribute to systemic risk, corporate
law must be re-calibrated to address these issues.
Finally, acknowledging the necessity of financial regulation does not mean that
corporate governance has no role to play – instead of being mutually exclusive, both
regulatory regimes can be mutually reinforcing. Examples of such mutuallyreinforcing governance regimes proliferate all spheres of corporate activity, across
many jurisdictions: public investors, for one, are usually protected from corporate
exploitation by a dual regime of private enforcement devices (shareholder lawsuits
for misrepresentations) as well as public enforcement (criminal sanctions or quasicriminal penalties).95 Specifically, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Young and
Thyil have proposed a “holistic approach” which includes multiple and overlapping
governance mechanisms: from firm-specific corporate codes of ethics which
informally shape corporate culture; to the public corporate governance framework
under national corporate governance codes or listing rules; and the outer layer of
capital markets regulations which at the minimum promotes disclosure and reduces
informational asymmetries, in order to facilitate the workings of a robust market
for corporate control.96 The point to emphasize is that corporate governance law
and financial or banking regulations are highly complementary tools – the former
regulates opportunistic behaviour of corporate actors; while the latter is largely
concerned with protecting firms’ asset cushions - yet both can work in tandem to
safeguard the firm from potential failure and prevent it from posing risks to the
system.

4.

Objection 3: Is the Goal of Protecting Systemic Stakeholders Over-broad and
Unverifiable?

Another objection to the idea that companies should take into account the interests
of the economic system is that this goal is far too broad for corporate governance
mechanisms to take into account, and accordingly, it would be difficult to verify if
directors and shareholders are indeed acting in the interests of systemic
stakeholders. For example, Kerr argues that taking the national economy’s interests
into consideration goes far beyond the constituencies normally recognized as
stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, creditors, and the local community
where business is located.97 It is hard to conceive of the idea of stakeholding
extending to “the entire economic health of the nation.”98

95. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 294–298.
96. See Stiglitz, supra note 4, at 365.
97. Stakeholder Analysis, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/
PoliticalEconomy/stakeholderanalysis.htm (last visited February 13, 2014).
98. J. E. Kerr, Note, The Financial Meltdown of 2008 and the Government’s Intervention: Much Needed Relief
or Major Erosion of American Corporate Law? The Continuing Story of Bank of America, Citigroup and General
Motors, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 49, 108 (2011).
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While this writer would acknowledge that taking the interests of the economy
into account extends the paradigm of stakeholding considerably, it is argued that
this paradigm is not over-broad to the extent that it becomes unverifiable. Firstly, it
is re-emphasized that systemic stakeholders, whose “stake” lies in the fact of their
exposure to systemic risk posed by the firm, do not include every conceivable
stakeholder – it excludes, for example, competitors, the media, social activists, and
the natural environment; constituencies that other stakeholder models routinely
attempt to include.99 Indeed, Max Clarkson, the founder of the risk-based
conception of stakeholding, himself recognized that “[s]takeholder theory should
not be used to weave a basket big enough to hold the world’s misery.”100
Furthermore, the protection of systemic stakeholders, while at first glance
seemingly an unverifiable objective, is actually quite susceptible to concretization,
both qualitatively and quantitatively. The key proxy for the protection of systemic
stakeholders is the degree to which a company presents systemic risks to the
economy. This can be measured by either a “too big to fail” or “too interconnected
to fail” test: the former looks at an aggregate of factors including an institution’s
size relative to the national or international marketplace, and market share
concentration;101 while the latter looks at the likelihood of a medium-term negative
impact to the larger economy of an institution’s failure to be able to continue its
ongoing business, taking into account the institution’s activities and the economic
multiplier of all other commercial activities dependent specifically on that
institution.102 These are not just theoretical formulae that companies cannot apply –
in fact, the “too interconnected to fail” test has been used both in the past and in
the recent financial crisis by the US Federal Government in considering whether an
institution should get bailout funding.103 It is contended that the same kind of
analysis can be undertaken by companies themselves in calibrating their risk
management and other corporate governance mechanisms.
Indeed, in comparison with the objectives of other variants of stakeholder
theory, minimizing systemic risk is far more tractable a goal. For example, taking a
corporate social responsibility paradigm of stakeholder theory, the oft-cited goals of
ensuring “ethical conduct” and “ecologically-responsible conduct” have to be
measured on multiple dimensions – this makes the pursuit and verification of
objectives a lot more intractable in comparison with systemic risk, which can to
some extent be measured by quantitative metrics.104 As Eddy Wymeersch, the

99. ROBERT PHILLIPS, STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS 119 –134 (2003).
100. Id. at 119.
101. Josh Rothman, Too Connected to Fail, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 8, 2012, 02:09 PM) http://www.boston
.com/bostonglobe/ideas/brainiac/2012/08/too_connected_t.html.
102. Systemic Risk Defined, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, www.pciaa.net/reg-reform
(last visited Jan. 2014).
103. Id.
104. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART 119 (2010).
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former Chairman of the Committee of European Securities Regulators, observes:
“The financial stability objective [of corporate governance] is less elusive than e.g.
[sic] social corporate responsibility.”105 Thus the apparent breadth and
unverifiability of the systemic stakeholder objective is less of a problem than
commonly perceived.

5.

Objection 4: Does the Systemic Stakeholder Model Imply that Shareholder Value
Should Not Be Maximized At All?

Some may contend that stakeholder models are completely incompatible with
shareholder value maximization, and that any decisions taken in favour of
stakeholders will necessarily be damaging to the company’s (and not just the
shareholders’) interests. For example, Milton Friedman champions the view that if
directors elect to keep open a plant to protect the interests of employees and the
local community when the plant is consistently making a loss, then the plant would
be forced to shut down in the long-term.106
It is argued that the systemic stakeholder paradigm is fully compatible with the
long-term value of the company. The systemic stakeholder paradigm, rather than
mutually excluding shareholder value maximization altogether, does take into
account the interests of shareholders.107 For example, one variation of stakeholder
theory, the enlightened value maximization paradigm, accepts that the company
should be governed in the interests of all stakeholders; but that long-term
shareholder value maximization provides a good proxy for the goal of protecting all
stakeholders.108 Under this version of stakeholder theory, the interests of
shareholders and the wider community of stakeholders are not mutually exclusive:
pursuing the long-term value of the company necessarily implies protecting the
sustainability of enterprise. Thus, this would require that corporate governance
takes into account any risks that the company may be imposing on the wider
financial and economic system, which would threaten both the convergent interests
of the company and the economic community that it is dependent on for long-term
survival.109 Ultimately, while pure shareholder primacy focuses on the interests of
shareholders alone, the systemic stakeholder view takes into account both

105. E. Wynmeersch, Corporate Governance and Financial Stability at 3, (Financial Law Institute Working
Paper 2008-2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1288631.
106. M. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, THE NEW YORK TIMES
MAGAZINE, Sep. 13, 1970, at 33; (cited in D. KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT, 339-340). (Oxford Uni. Pres.,
2009).
107. V.H. Ho, Enlightened Shareholder Value: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder
Divide at 62, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1476116 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
108. M. Jensen, Value Maximization Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 7 EUR. FIN.
MGMT. 297, 299 (2001).
109. See Gevurtz, supra note 88, at 151, 154.
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shareholders and other stakeholders in the system, and attempts to integrate their
interests holistically.

II. Deficiencies in the Means of Corporate Governance - The
Failure of the Board of Directors and Shareholders to Protect
Systemic Stakeholders and their Causal Links to the Financial Crisis
Building on Part I, in lieu of the conclusion that the purpose of corporate
governance is to serve both shareholders as well as the interests of the financial
system and wider economy, the discussion proceeds to analyze how well the key
means of corporate governance – the board of directors and shareholders – has
functioned in achieving this objective. It is contended that both the board and
shareholders have failed in protecting systemic stakeholders, and that this failure to
guard against systemic risks precipitated the crisis. The balance of this section
proceeds as follows: Part II.A briefly discusses the role of corporate governance in
the crisis from a general angle; II.B – II.D discuss the particular failings of the board
of directors – categorizing them under the headings of defective composition,
structures, and duties; and II.E discusses the particular role of shareholders in
facilitating poor corporate governance. The perspective taken is that of AngloAmerican corporate governance, given that the US and UK were the focal points of
the financial crisis.

A.

The Role of Corporate Governance in the Financial Crisis

On one view, corporate governance demonstrated no deficiencies; nor was it
causative of the 2009 financial crisis. This is the position adopted by Cheffins, who
argues that corporate governance has improved significantly in the last decade, with
many financial firms demonstrating indicators of good governance – boards with
high numbers of independent directors, the establishment of risk and audit
committees, and greater shareholder involvement in corporate activities.110
The opposing view, supported by this writer, counters Cheffins by arguing that
there has been a more “fundamental systemic failure” of corporate governance111 such that what is traditionally seen as indicators of good governance, such as
independent boards or shareholder empowerment, are in fact the wrong means of
guarding against risks to the system. As the discussion proceeds to demonstrate,
much of our conventional wisdom regarding director independence, board
diversity, risk management structures and board duties is misconceived or overly
myopic; in assuming that governance mechanisms designed to protect shareholders

110. See generally Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance Fail During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown?
The Case of the S&P 500, BUS. LAW. Vol. 65, No. 1.
111. SUN, STEWART & POLLARD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 4–6, (Cambridge U. Press 2011).
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from managerial agency costs work equally well in guarding against risks to
systemic stakeholders. Consequently, this lack of foresight contributed to poor
corporate governance which precipitated the financial crisis.

B.

Deficiencies in Board Composition: Sacrificing Competence for Independence and
a Lack of Diversity

1.

Sacrificing Competence for Independence

The board of directors is traditionally understood to straddle a dual function: to
manage the company as well as to monitor the performance of executives.112 In the
US, the Section 8.01(b) of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) provides
that the business and affairs of the corporation are to be managed under the
direction of the board;113 while Art. 3 of the UK Model Articles of Association for
Public and Private Companies provides that the directors are responsible for the
management of the company’s business.114 At the same time, it is a truism that the
board is not obliged to run the company on a day-to-day basis and instead takes a
supervisory role most of the time by establishing plans and monitoring
performance.115
However, due to the need to ensure un-conflicted supervision of executives,
Anglo-American corporate governance law has shown a steady trend towards
emphasizing the monitoring role of directors, reflected in an increasing focus on
having qualitatively higher standards for independence and quantitatively more
independent directors on boards and committees.116 It is partly due to this overemphasis on independence that the need for financial expertise was relegated to a
secondary priority, thus weakening the ability of boards to understand the financial
difficulties their companies were mired in during the run-up to the crisis.117
To elaborate, the impetus towards independence accelerated in the early 2000s,
following the Enron and WorldCom scandals, which demonstrated that previous
requirements for independence were insufficiently stringent or detailed. For
example, as Elson points out, despite the fact that Enron had 13 formally
independent non-executive directors on a board of 15 members, various
relationships between these directors and the company rendered their alleged
independence more of a facade; such as long tenures (more than 15 years), and
112. See Kraakman et al., supra note 19, at 56.
113. Id.
114. The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations, 2008, S.I. 2008/3229, art. 2, ¶ 3 (U.K.).
115. Kraakman et al., supra note 19, at 66.
116. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 94, at 66, 79.
117. See Merson, supra note 84, at 22 (“In a report published in September 2008, the Association of
Chartered Certified Accountants wrote. . .[t]he use of overly compex financial products, which thwarted
effective supervisory control, and the unethical advancement, at the point of sale, of loans to people with little
realistic hope of repaying them shows a lack of basic corporate governance.”).
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substantial fees (over US $350,000 per year worth of stock options), which caused
directors to become more acquiescent to management.118 As the US Congressional
Hearings preceding the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) found, these
directors of scandal-ridden companies had “extensive social and professional ties
with corporate officers and their fellow directors that compromised their ability to
be impartial and undermined their ability to provide an adequate check on
directors.”119
In response, Anglo-American corporate governance standards of independence
were raised. Firstly, the required number of independent directors on boards and
board committees was increased. For example, SOX required the NYSE Listing
Rules to provide for a majority of independent directors on the board and an audit
committee comprising solely of independent directors.120 Secondly, the definition of
independence was given more rigour to foreclose opportunities for conflicts of
interest to arise. The 2003 UK Higgs Report on “The Role and Effectiveness of NonExecutive Directors” took to task the earlier definition of “independence” in the
1998 UK Combined Code of Corporate Governance, criticizing it for being
insufficiently specific.121 Thus it further supplemented the definition of
independence by specifying various relationships and circumstances which would
compromise independence, including, inter alia: material business relationships;
status as a former employee (within 5 years of terminating employment); the
receipt of any sort of remuneration apart from a director’s fee; and holding crossdirectorships or having significant links with other directors through involvement
in other organizations.122
This increasing focus on independence – a knee-jerk response to corporate
scandals, was actually creating a long-term problem that would manifest itself in the
financial crisis. The problem, as stated by Kershaw, is that of the “independenceknowledge trade-off”;123 the broader the definition of independence, the more
difficult it becomes to find individuals who are willing to serve on the board and
who have a firm understanding of the company and its industry. While
independent non-executive directors ensure un-conflicted monitoring, they do not
necessarily ensure informed management or even effective oversight (since they may

118. C. Elson, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 871
(2003).
119. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 149 (2010) (internal
citations omitted).
120. NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A.01, available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303A_Final
_rules.pdf (“Listed companies must have a majority of independent directors. Commentary: Effective boards of
directors exercise independent judgment in carrying out their responsibilities. Requiring a majority of
independent directors will increase the quality.”). See also Sharfman, supra note 21, at 59–60.
121. KALA ANANDARAJAH, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PRACTICE AND ISSUES, 109–112 (Academy Publishing,
2010).
122. See Anandarajah, supra note 121, at 109–112.
123. See Alexander et. al, supra note 18, at 244.
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lack understanding of the company to the point where they do not know how to
look out for “red flags”).124 As Kershaw observes, a “broad definition of
independence effectively takes a risk that the pool of advisory talent will continue to
be deep enough”125 – a poor gamble, as illustrated by the 2009 crisis.
In the context of the financial crisis, the problem was that stringent definitions of
independence made it difficult for financial institutions to find independent
directors who had sufficiently deep expertise in the industry, since the relevant pool
of experts with such financial knowledge is naturally concentrated and limited to
those who have had employment experience in the industry – so-called “insiders.”126
A report by Guerra and Thal-Larsen127 quotes headhunters as stating that “one of
the unintended consequences of SOX is that its emphasis on independence rules
out from board positions a lot of people who knew about this [financial]
business.”128 This translated into many of the boards of crisis-hit financial
institutions having insufficient expertise: Kirkpatrick notes that at eight US major
financial institutions, two-thirds of directors had no banking experience, yet were
sitting on highly technical board committees covering audit and risk - precisely due
to the independence requirements.129 In the same vein, Sharpe points out that the
board members of Merrill Lynch and Citigroup, although having prestigious
degrees and other qualifications, lacked meaningful accounting and financial
expertise to effectively monitor the activities of investment banks.130
To compound the problem, it was not just the case that stringent definitions of
“independence” in the listing rules and corporate governance codes naturally
excluded competent individuals; it was that the need for independence became the
touchstone of good governance such that “the emphasis on objective indicia of
conflicts dominated the selection process to the exclusion of the indicia of basic
competence and good judgment.”131 As US-based empirical studies demonstrate,
companies increasingly began to focus on negative checklists of conflicts, relegating
positive lists of qualifications to secondary importance, in choosing board
members.132 As Bainbridge puts it, independence became a “fetish” in itself133 -

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 94, at 81.
127. F. Guerra and P. Thal Larsen, Gone by the Board: Why the directors of big banks failed to spot credit risks,
FINANCIAL TIMES, (June 16, 2008).
128. Id.
129. Kirkpatrick, supra note 94, at 79–80.
130. Nicola F. Sharpe, Rethinking Board Function in the Wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis, 5 J. OF BUS. &
TECH. L. 99, 109 (2010).
131. Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 104.
132. Kirkpatrick, supra note 94, at 81.
133. Id. at 81–82.
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resulting in a lack of knowledge just as dangerous to corporate health as the conflict
of interest problems in the previous wave of corporate scandals.134
While this imbalance between independence and competence can be attributed
to Anglo-American corporate governance as a whole, it may be qualified that the
problem is less acute in the UK context. Based on Grant Thorton’s research findings
commissioned by the FRC,135 the latter concluded that sectoral experience and
industry-related experience amongst directors on the boards of a selection of FTSE
350 companies had increased by about 7% from 2002 onwards (the year before the
independence provisions were introduced), thus suggesting no loss of competence
as a result of the more rigorous independence requirements.136 With due respect to
the Thorton review, one may argue that these findings are inconclusive:
competence could arguably have increased even more had there been no overemphasis on independence. Further, looking at the absolute figures, even with the
increase, sectoral experience and industry experience were 30% and 59%
respectively, numbers which do not inspire much confidence in the ability of the
board to effectively monitor and manage large complex companies.137 Nonetheless,
it is possible that competency problems are less acute in the UK as compared with
the US, given that the majority of criticisms stem from US commentary.

2.

Lack of Diversity and Problems of “Group-think”

Notwithstanding the over-emphasis on formal criteria for independence, the
objectivity of the board has yet been compromised by a lack of diversity and more
subtle behavioural dynamics which undermine effective independent judgement by
individual directors who may meet all the stringent requirements for independence.
In a thought-provoking report entitled “Did Board Configuration Matter? The Case
of US Subprime Lenders,”138 Maureen Muller-Kahle and Krista Lewellyn find that
firms in the in financial industry which had less gender-diverse boards were prone
to greater subprime lending and excessive risk-taking, based on survey of 74 USbased publically-traded firms over a nine-year period.139
The lack of women points toward a more fundamental flaw in boardroom
composition – a lack of diversity which can exacerbate problems of “groupthink.”140 “Group-think” refers to a collective cognitive bias which impedes the
134. Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Governance of Banks after the Fin. Crisis, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR
COMPARATIVE AND INT’L PRIVATE LAW, 4–5 (Aug. 29, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1918851.
135. Fin. Reporting Council, supra note 86, at 15.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. M. Muller-Kahle & K. Lewellyn, Did Board Configuration Matter? The Case of US Subprime Lenders, 19
CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 405 (2011).
139. Id.
140. K. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations,
45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 55, 55 (2011).
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effectiveness of deliberative, group decision-making processes.141 As Johnson notes,
group-think can lead boards of directors in systemically significant financial
institutions to “perilous consequences, including enterprise risk management
failures, insolvency, or market disruption.”142
One specific example of group-think is what behavioural economists call
“structural bias” – a cognitive problem which impedes a director’s ability to exercise
objective judgment in circumstances which involve persons with whom the director
has relational ties.143 Since board members are generally selected from a small pool
of candidates who often participate in similar educational and professional circles,
sharing many affiliations – what some commentators have termed an “old boys’
network”144 – it is often the case that these relational ties cause individual directors
to abandon their perceptions regarding a particular issue and adopt an opinion that
reflects the group consensus, rather than engage in rigorous debate to generate the
benefits of deliberative decision-making.145
These problems of group-think are compounded by the lack of women in the
boardroom. Singh, Terjesen and Vinnicombe report that only 15% of Fortune 500
boards have a woman on the board.146 In the FTSE 250, the percentage of female
non-executive directors fell from 9% in 2007 to 8.7% in 2008, part of a consistently
low historic trend of female participation in the boardroom.147 Branson’s recent
2011 global survey on female directors reveals that this is a ubiquitous problem
across many jurisdictions: while the overall European average is 11.7% female
representation, Germany reports 7% (on supervisory, and not managing, boards),
while the US stands at 15.2%.148 The state of female participation is not much better
in the Asia-Pacific: Australia leads with 10.6%, while New Zealand follows with
9.3%, and Hong Kong at 8.9%.149 While it would certainly stretch logic to attribute
the financial crisis to the lack of female directors, the financial crisis can be said to
have highlighted a deeper root problem in board composition – a lack of diversity,
and accordingly, objective judgment in the dynamics of group decision-making.

141. Id.
142. Id. at 103.
143. Id. at 104.
144. Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, supra note 138, at 408.
145. Johnson, supra note 140, at 104–105.
146. Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, supra note 138, at 408.
147. Wheeler, supra note 13, at 276.
148. Douglas M. Branson, Women on Boards of Directors: A Global Snapshot, UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW, 1 (Feb. 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762615.
149. Id. at 2.
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C.

Deficiencies in Board Structure: Lack of Risk Management Structures, Unintegrated Approaches and Informational Deficiencies

1.

The Lack of Risk Management Structures

Risk management refers to the process by which the board of directors defines a
company’s strategies and objectives so as to strike an optimal balance between
growth and related risks.150 Such risks include operational risks – risks of faulty
controls, fraud and human error; market risks – risks in the trading books of debt
and equity instruments linked to changes in the market; and credit risk – risk that a
change in the credit quality of a counterparty would affect the firm’s own value.151 It
is important to stress the interconnection of these risks to systemic risk: in simple
terms, the more a firm is exposed to operational, market and credit risk; and the
larger and more interconnected it gets, the more the firm poses a risk to the entire
financial system and economy if its operational, market or credit risks materialize in
ways that adversely affect the firm. Risk management thus seeks to detect, assess and
respond to such risks by avoidance (refraining from certain risk-laden
transactions), transferring risk through hedging, or mitigating risks through
responsive control measures.152
There is no question that risk management by boards was insufficiently robust
and a major contributor to the financial crisis. For example, a 2008 Towers Perrin
survey of CFOs reveals that 72% of surveyed companies had under-developed risk
management processes, and 62% considered poor risk management to be a major
contributor to the financial crisis – attributing even more blame to boards’ risk
management failures than the inherent complexity of financial products (which
55% of respondents considered the major factor).153
Where exactly lay the fractures in risk management systems? Certainly, while risk
models and stress testing failed due to mistaken technical assumptions, there exists
a more pervasive corporate governance dimension in the failures of risk
management.154 Firstly, many firms involved in the 2009 financial crisis had poor
risk management structures. Several commentators have pointed out how previous
reforms such as SOX-mandated internal controls focussed primarily on financial
reporting and disclosures, for example SOX S.302 which provides for CEO and

150. Enterprise Risk Management—Integrated Framework Executive Summary, COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, 1 (Sept. 2004), http://www.coso.org/documents/coso_erm_
executivesummary.pdf.
151. Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 166.
152. Id. at 166–67.
153. Michelle M. Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in the
Economic Crisis, 5 J. OF BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 49 (2010).
154. Blanaid Clarke, ‘Corporate Governance’ an Oxymoron? The Role of Corporate Governance in the Current
Banking Crisis, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 253, 261 (Iain MacNeil & Justin O’Brien eds., 2010).
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CFO certification of the accuracy of annual and quarterly reports.155 Consequently,
companies missed the forest for the trees – failing to recognize that such internal
controls were but a subset of risk management in the broader context.156
Furthermore, the structure of Anglo-American board committees tends to place
risk management under the jurisdiction of the audit committee, which as Fanto
observes may have been over-worked in the light of its pre-existing compliance
requirements.157 Thus board structures did not place sufficient emphasis on proper
risk detection and monitoring.

2.

Un-integrated Risk Management

Secondly, even with such board structures, some firms demonstrated a deeper
problem of un-integrated and un-embedded risk management. To put it another
way, many firms took a “silo”, as opposed to comprehensive and coordinated,
approach to risk management.158 Harner gives the example of UBS, where each
group within the organizational structure did have a given role to play in the risk
management process, but the board failed to coordinate or monitor the groups.159
The division of tasks – for example between CRO, CFO and corporate counsel, was
meant to facilitate division of labour and specialization, but instead resulted in a
segregated approach to risk management where no one, in particular the board
charged with the responsibility of oversight, had sufficient understanding of the
company’s total risk exposure.160 These deficiencies demonstrate that merely putting
in place risk committees and CROs may not sufficiently address the need for firmwide integrated risk management.

3.

Structural Holes in Information Transmission and Processing

Additionally, one major reason for the lack of an integrated risk management
system is the absence of upward information flows. In Pirson and Turnbull’s
analysis, the problem lies with the hierarchical structure of the board.161 The
argument is that while risks originate in one part of the organization lower down
the corporate hierarchy (such as the sales department), the actual management of
the risks is to be carried out by another part further up the chain of command – the

155. Kirkpatrick, supra note 94, at 79.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Harner, supra note 153, at 50.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See generally Michael Pirson & Shann Turnbull, Towards Humanistic Governance? How Network
Governance Structures Can Support Better Decision Making and Risk Management, FORDHAM U. SCH. OF BUS.
(Sept. 19, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1679450.
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board of directors.162 One commonplace example of this informational dynamic is
the party game of “telephone”, which illustrates how the meaning of a message can
get very confused after being related through a chain of individuals. Pirson and
Turnbull assert that, based on a theoretical model of 50% accuracy retention,
information conveyed from workers through the mid-level and senior management
can ultimately lose over 90% of its original content by the time it reaches the board
of directors.163 While these arguments may seem to rest too heavily on theory, the
authors do point to significant informational failures during the financial crisis to
buttress their case: for example, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy report highlights
that the board was unaware of several critical pieces of information regarding the
firm’s dire risk position, such as the fact that several high-risk bridge equity deals
had been excluded from Lehman’s risk appetite usage calculations, which would
have taken it over its risk appetite limit in 2007.164 Also, several employees down the
corporate hierarchy were known to have reported their concerns over excessive
risk-taking to senior managers and the external auditors, though these reports were
not made available to the board.165 As such, it is asserted that “communication
failure is more likely the principal cause of the crisis.”166
Pirson and Turnbull’s argument parallels another earlier analysis – Lawrence
Mitchell’s theory of structural holes and informational monopolies.167 According to
Mitchell, the board faces a fundamental structural problem: given that corporate
personnel are organized into distinct networks with no ties, the actor who can
bridge two distinct networks can attain control over the flow of information.168
Thus, because the board consists primarily of outside directors with no networks in
the firm, it becomes open to the CEO to bridge this “structural gap” and exploit it
to his advantage.169 Mitchell cites the example of Enron to demonstrate how Skilling
exploited the structural gap between the outside directors of the board and
employees further down the corporate chain to stem any possibility of negative
information being transmitted upward.170 Mitchell’s analysis adds another
dimension to Pirson and Turnbull’s, by suggesting how information may not only
be lost inadvertently going up the corporate ladder, but also deliberately where
strong CEOs desire to opportunistically restrict the flow of information to the

162. Id. at 10.
163. Id. at 10–11.
164. Michael Pirson & Shann Turnbull, Corp. Governance, Risk Mgmt., and the Fin. Crisis – An Information
Processing Review, FORDHAM U. SCH. OF BUS., 6–8 (Dec. 11, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723782.
165. Id.
166. Pirson & Turnbull, supra note 161, at 9–10.
167. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies: The Missing
Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2005).
168. Id. at 1321.
169. Id. at 1346.
170. Id. at 1352–53.
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board.171 Indeed, Mitchell’s analysis is directly relevant to the financial crisis. One
egregious example is that of the former Lehman CFO, Chris O’Meara, who did not
want the board to know that Lehman was approaching the firm-wide risk appetite
limit, as the analysis by his subordinates demonstrated.172 Thus he removed the limit
from the standard chart presented to the board, a clear illustration of an actor
exploiting an informational gap.173 Accordingly, these analyses suggest that
hierarchical boards may not be in the best position to receive and process
information pertaining to firm risks.

D.

Deficiencies in Board Duties: Insufficient Liability for Oversight Failures

The problem of defective risk management is exacerbated by an enervated duty of
care in the field of risk monitoring, a problem especially pertinent in US case law. It
is evident that “[p]otential legal liability also influences corporate conduct.”174 Thus,
in addition to poorly-designed board structures, a lack of legal liability for directors
can be said to have facilitated board failures of oversight in risk management. It
must be emphasized that the duty of care that is in question here is not that of
decision-making (which involves commercial judgments and is in appropriate cases
protected by the business judgement rule which precludes hindsight review of
directors’ actions); but rather the duty of monitoring – that of ensuring that the
company has the necessary systems in place to ensure accurate and timely
information, and to respond accordingly when these systems show “red flags.”175
In what particular way is the architecture of this duty of monitoring deficient?
The key problem in American jurisprudence is that the Delaware courts have
presently excluded oversight responsibility for business risks from the scope of a
director’s duty of care, as held in Re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation
(Citigroup).176 According to the Citigroup court, while directors do have a general
duty of monitoring, which cover legal risks such as fraud; this duty does not extend
to managing commercial (for example, credit, market, operational and systemic)
risks.177
This unduly narrow duty of monitoring fails to safeguard against excessive
corporate risk-taking which threatens systemic stability. For example, in Citigroup,
the financial firm’s directors were not held personally liable to ensure that systems
were in place to manage Citigroup’s risk to the subprime mortgage market – though
it was clear that Citigroup’s marketing of collaterized debt obligations (CDOs), a

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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form of derivate security consisting of repackaged pools of lower rated securities,
heavily exposed Citigroup to market, credit and operational risk in the region of
US$55 billion.178 Given Citigroup’s systemic importance, the risks to the firm meant
that systemic interests were implicated as well.179
Further, as Bainbridge points out, the distinction between risk management and
legal compliance is not entirely sustainable, since the latter is but a subset of the
former.180 As stated by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO), compliance with regulations is one of four broad categories
of enterprise risk management, along with effective use of resources, reliable
disclosures and pursuit of strategic goals.181 For example, the WorldCom accounting
fraud, which involved losses of US$11 billion, may be seen as a failure of accounting
controls as well as a broader failure of operational risk management – part of the
board’s wider duties to manage enterprise risk of all forms.182 Thus, the
unprincipled line-drawing by US courts between legal compliance and commercial
risk management in the delineation of directors’ duties of monitoring represents
another instance of corporate governance’s failure to protect the system from
excessive risk-taking by the company.

E.

Abdication of Shareholders’ Responsibilities

As suggested above,183 institutional shareholders had a key role to play in facilitating
the financial crisis. In fact, a very recent study by Erkens, Hung and Matos184 based
on a dataset of 296 financial firms from 30 countries at the centre of the crisis
demonstrates that firms with higher institutional ownership experienced worse
stock returns during the crisis period because institutional shareholders encouraged
more risk-taking.185 This risk-taking is accompanied by short-termist strategies
which are not conducive to long-term corporate growth – for example, hedge funds
often attempt to drive up short-term earnings at the expense of long-term results by

178. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 978 (2009).
179. Bainbridge, supra note 178, at 978.
180. Id. at 981.
181. Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework Executive Summary, COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, 3 (Sept. 2004), http://www.coso.org/documents/coso_erm_
executivesummary.pdf.
182. Vivek Sharma, Worldcom Debacle – A Case Study in Risk Management, SACHING.COM (Oct. 15, 2011,
4:54 A.M.), http://www.saching.com/Articles/Worldcom-Debacle-A-Case-Study-in-Risk-Management10387.html.
183. See supra Part I.B.iii.
184. David H. Erkens, Mingyi Hung, & Pedro Matos, Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial
Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 389 (2012).
185. Id.
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cutting research and development, or moving revenues from future periods into
current accounting periods.186
The short-termist strategy is justified on the dubious economic theory of the
Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, which asserts that stock prices accurately
capture the fundamental economic values of companies and that any increase in
stock price must reflect an equivalent increase in value, whether in the short or
long-term.187 In reality, the premises of this theory are highly questionable – it
assumes that investors have all relevant information about the long-term value of a
firm, an assumption that rarely plays out in reality. For example, in the context of
the financial crisis, investors did not have complete appreciation of the probability
of the housing market crash, given that the risk of such an outcome was an
“unknown unknown” – a high impact, rare-event risk.188 Thus, the corporate values
of many financial firms were in reality over-inflated due to the “irrational
exuberance” of institutional investors caught up in the euphoria of the housing
bubble, while not taking into account the longer-term risks to the company and the
financial system.189
The excessively risky and short-termist corporate strategies encouraged by
institutional shareholders represent a clear defect in the architecture of corporate
governance. Specifically, they suggest that institutional shareholders do not
appreciate that their position of influence in companies entails responsibilities as
well as rights.190 Such responsibilities were emphasized in UK Corporate
Governance as early as 1992, in the widely-respected Cadbury Report which
identified institutional shareholders as having fundamentally important power,
given the weight of their votes, to influence the standards of corporate
governance.191 Similarly, the UK National Association of Pension Funds has
previously articulated that “share ownership also gives rise to governance
responsibilities. . .directed towards the enhancement of long-term shareholder
value and the wider economic benefits which this should also engender.”192 The
long-standing failure of institutional investors to take these pronouncements into
account thus facilitated excessive risk-taking at the cost to the economy.

186.
(2008).
187.
188.
189.
190.
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III. Reforming Corporate Governance – Re-conceptualising the
Roles and Responsibilities of the Board of Directors and
Shareholders

A.

The Underlying Principle of Reform: Both Directors and Shareholders as
“Stewards for Systemic Stakeholders”

Given the aforementioned problems of defective board composition, structures and
duties, and shareholder irresponsibility, it is submitted that reforms are in order. It
is argued that the corporate governance paradigm underlying these reforms is that
of stewardship for the system as a stakeholder in the company – that is, both directors
and shareholders have responsibilities to play in governing the company, not only
for its internal stakeholders but its external socio-economic stakeholders as well.
Currently, there exists an ongoing debate on the correct means of corporate
governance between those who take a “director primacy” and those who take a
“shareholder empowerment” view.193 Those in the former camp take the position
that shareholders lack incentives to gather information necessary to participate
actively in decision making and rational shareholders would be apathetic given that
the opportunity cost of making informed decisions is significant – hence the need
for the board of directors as a centralized decision-making body.194 The latter
“shareholder empowerment view” emphasizes that the directors often shirk or selfdeal, such that shareholder involvement is necessary to constrain such agency
costs.195
The problem with this debate is that it has started from the premise that
maximizing shareholder value is the ends of the company and consequently,
narrowed the means of corporate governance into a binary, mutually-exclusive fix –
either directors or shareholders should govern the company. This unhelpful debate
can be transcended once we see that the ends of the company include other
stakeholders, in particular the interests of the economy and financial system.
Accordingly, the roles of board of directors and shareholders can be reconceptualized to meet these ends in a way that involves both enhancing the board
and also giving shareholders responsibilities in the governance of the company. At
the conceptual level, I suggest that both directors and shareholders can be seen as
“stewards”. The role of directors as stewards draws from Donaldson and Davis’
work which emphasizes the benefits of facilitative authority structures.196 This has
also been reflected in UK corporate governance to some extent – the Cadbury

193. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735
(2006).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See generally Lex Donaldson & James H. Davis, Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance
and Shareholder Returns, 16 AUSTL. J. MGMT. 49 (1991).
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Report expressly describes directors as having “stewardship” responsibilities.197 On
the other hand, influential shareholders, in particular institutional shareholders, are
increasingly been seen as stewards as well – as the non-profit think tank
Tomorrow’s Company notes, institutional shareholders may be viewed as
“universal owner[s who] own[s] a small[,] but representative fraction of most of the
companies in an economy, [hence] their ability to satisfy their fiduciary duties
depend on the economy’s overall efficiency and performance.”198 Thus, institutional
shareholders have responsibilities vis a vis the wider economy as well. Indeed, the
UK FRC has recently implemented a “Stewardship Code” for institutional investors,
highlighting the need for their accountability to all corporate stakeholders.199 It is
submitted that the convergence of this “stewardship” label for directors and
institutional shareholders is not merely coincidental – rather, it reflects a slowly
growing consensus that both directors and shareholders have responsibilities to the
sustenance of long-term corporate value and the interests of the wider economy.
The balance of this section proceeds by examining how board composition,
structures and duties, as well as shareholders’ responsibilities, can be enhanced to
safeguard against systemic risks. Where relevant, I examine some of the steps taken
by the UK and US in response to the financial crisis, to determine if they effectively
remedy the defects in corporate governance which contributed to the financial
crisis. Where insufficient, I suggest additional measures, including observations on
their viability.

B.

Re-composing the Board:

1.

Striking the Right Balance Between Competence and Independence

In the US, the primary reform vehicle, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, does not tackle the problem of excessive focus on
independence in any way.200 In contrast, the UK has been more proactive in this
respect, addressing this issue in its 2009 Review of the Combined Code.201 However,
the UK Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) response was limited to including a
new provision stating that: “The board and its committees should have the
appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the

197. See Villiers, supra note 43, at 290.
198. Tomorrow’s Owners Stewardship of tomorrow’s company, CENTRE FOR TOMORROW’S COMPANY (Oct.
2008), http://tomorrowscompany.com/tomorrows-owners-stewardship-of-tomorrows-company.
199. See infra III.E; see generally The UK Stewardship Code, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (Sept. 2012),
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Stewardship-Code-September2012.pdf.
200. Corp. Governance in the Wake of the Fin. Crisis, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., 29–
32 (Oct. 2010), http://vi.unctad.org/digital-library/?task=dl_doc&doc_name=582-corporate-go.
201. Fin. Reporting Council, supra note 86.
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company to enable them to discharge their respective duties and responsibilities
effectively.”202
This response, while having the correct intention to ensure the balance between
competence and independence, does not strike this writer as a particularly robust
reform. It does not give any guidance on the definition of an “appropriate balance”,
without which compliance cannot be ascertained. Thus there would not even be
anything to comply with or explain away; further diluting the already muted
enforcement regime in the UK context, which relies on private “comply or explain”
enforcement rather than the threat of de-listing or regulatory sanctions for noncompliance.203
How then should the competence factor be enhanced? It is proposed that the UK
could go one step further in its 2010 Corporate Governance Code by annexing a list
of “best practice” competence indicia from various industries, to provide some
measure of guidance for directors. These industry-specific criteria can be readily
found in guidelines provided by industry regulators, but are seldom reflected in
national corporate governance codes which state competence requirements at too
high a level of generality. For example, in response to the financial crisis, financial
regulators of various countries such as the Irish Central bank have increased “fitness
and probity” standards for board members of financial institutions.204 These
standards are still general enough to reflect the diversity of financial firms, but
provide more guidance given the particular needs of the financial industry. Drawing
from this experience, it is suggested that corporate governance regulators could
collect these guidelines or best practice indicia from various industries and annex
them as a reference to the relevant code provision on board composition, perhaps
in a tabulated manner so as to compare competency requirements across industries.
Again, it is important to emphasize that this proposal does not mean to promote a
“one-size-fits-all” approach to industry-specific corporate governance – for
example, within an “experience” criterion for competency, a range of years could be
specified which differs from industry to industry. At the same time, it is meant to
provide clearer guidance for prospective directors. Also, by incorporating these best
practice guidelines into the corporate governance code instead of leaving them as
legally-unenforceable industry-specific suggestions, these guidelines at least become
backed by the UK “comply or explain” regime, ensuring greater corporate
accountability for boardroom competency.205 The US, given that its regime relies on
mandatory NYSE listing rules, may find that mandating competency requirements
202. The UK Corp. Governance Code, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, 6 (Sept. 2012), http://www.frc.org.uk/OurWork/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Stewardship-Code-September-2012.pdf.
203. Id. at 4.–5.
204. See generally Fitness and Probity Standards (Code issued under Section 50 of the Cent. Bank Reform Act
2010), CENT. BANK OF IR. (2011), http://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/processes/fandp/Documents/Fitness%
20and%20Probity%20Standards%20(final)%2030%20November%202011.pdf.
205. Fin. Reporting Council, supra note 86.
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under the threat of de-listing constitutes too heavy-handed an approach. Thus, it
could adapt this proposal to suit its particular regime, for example issuing such
competency guidelines from the NYSE as non-binding suggestions, rather than
incorporate them into their mandatory listing rules. This would at least emphasize
the need for greater industry-specific competency, a problem which has been overlooked until the outbreak of the recent crisis.

2.

Introducing Diversity and Objective Judgment into the Boardroom

To counter the problems of group-think, the solution should not just be to increase
formalistic criteria for “independent” directors – firstly, this would exacerbate
problems of insufficient competency as discussed above; and secondly, this would
not improve the psychological and cognitive dynamics of the boardroom. One
solution is to focus on increasing diversity as a measure of better deliberative
decision-making in group settings. In diversifying boards, one of the more pressing
concerns relates to the lack of female directors. Empirical studies have
demonstrated that increasing female participation in the boardroom can meet the
need for “cognitive conflict” in group decision-making, viz, task-oriented
differences in judgment that can generate discussion and improve the quality of
decisions.206 For example, a 2007 McKinsey survey revealed that companies with a
higher proportion of women on their management committees were 47% more
profitable.207
To enhance gender diversity on boards, one can take a softer approach by
recommending the need for a more balanced gender mix on boards; or a more
stringent approach which actually mandates quotas for female participation. The
former approach is adopted by the UK FRC in its 2009 Review of the Combined
Code, which recognized the benefits of gender diversity in reducing group-think
and thus amended its supporting principles regarding appointments (B.2 of the
current UK Corporate Governance Code) to state that: “The search for board
candidates should be conducted, and appointments made, on merit, against
objective criteria and with due regard for the benefits of diversity on the board,
including gender” [emphasis mine].208 The second method of introducing quotas for
female participation is being actively considered by the European Parliament. In
fact, the EU Parliament has, in July 2011, already given EU businesses an ultimatum
to voluntarily increase female participation from the current 10% to 30% by 2015,
with the ultimate objective of achieving 40% female representation by 2020 on the

206. Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, supra note 138, at 408.
207. Launch of the Singapore Board Gender Diversity Report ‘A Focus on the Female Factor’, MINISTRY OF
SOCIAL AND FAMILY DEVELOPMENT (Oct. 25, 2011), http://app.msf.gov.sg/PressRoom/LaunchSingaporeboard
genderdiversityreport.aspx.
208. Fin. Reporting Council, supra note 202, at 12.
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boards of large EU listed companies.209 If the voluntary measures fail to have
substantial effect by 2012, the EU Parliament would table legislation to introduce a
mandatory quota of 40% female participation.210
Comparing the two approaches, this writer finds the softer approach preferable.
I echo the UK FRC’s concern that the quota-based method of introducing diversity
is too prescriptive211 – it fails to give sufficient leeway for an individual firm’s
makeup, for example where the firm requires more financially-competent directors,
who so happen to be male. The kind of “quick-fix” solution promulgated by the EU
Parliament may also cause problems in transition – either requiring that boards
increase their numbers to include more women; or substitute current male
members with more women. In either case, the solution would dramatically alter
board composition in too precipitate a fashion, and may sacrifice experienced male
members at the altar of a new obsession with “diversity”. Furthermore, as Branson
points out, quota laws may result in female executives becoming “fast-tracked”,
such that boardrooms would end up being populated by unqualified and figurehead
female directors – a solution which militates against the true spirit of diversity,
which is to include meaningful opposing perspectives.212
Thus, it is suggested that the need for diversity be introduced into corporate
governance codes as an aspirational provision, with corporate governance
regulators giving guidelines of a target level of participation within a specified time
frame – but without being backed by the threat of a mandatory quota. Another
variation of the “soft” approach which may have slightly more “teeth” is the use of
“certificate and pledge programs”. These pledges, which require public companies
to add women to their boards if they have voluntarily subscribed to the pledge, have
proven to be quite effective: as Branson highlights, 110 of the largest Dutch
companies (including Shell, Phillips, and Heineken) have signed up and followed
through the pledges, contributing to an increase in female board representation
from approximately 7% in 2006 to 20.9% in 2010.213 The key factor for the success
of these pledge programs rests on firms’ reputational capital, which incentivizes
their participation (for example, major Dutch companies would not want to be seen
publically as being discriminatory), and also compels their implementation of the
promised level of female representation. At the same time, the pledge system is far
less onerous than a quota system – thus it may be a useful “mid-way” solution

209. Valentina Pop, EU parliament backs female quotas for top corporate jobs, EU OBSERVER (July 7, 2011,
9:25 AM), http://euobserver.com/institutional/32598.
210. Id.
211. Feedback Statement: Gender Diversity on Boards, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, 4 (Oct. 2011), https://www.
frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Feedback-Statement-Gender-Diversity-on-boards.
aspx.
212. Branson, supra note 154, at 9.
213. Id. at 10–11.
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between mandatory female representation and unenforceable aspirational
standards.

C.

Re-structuring the Board: New Board Structures and Network Governance to
Facilitate Integrated Risk Management

Given the problems of structural deficiencies, informational loopholes and unintegrated risk management, the regulatory response has not been particularly
strong. In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates the creation of board-level risk
management committees, but only for publicly-traded bank holding companies and
those non-bank financial services companies supervised by the Federal Reserve.214
As Bainbridge observes: “The federal forbearance reflected in these modest
developments is rather surprising given the significant role of risk management
failures in the crisis.”215 The UK’s response has been almost similar: the FRC has
likewise refrained from suggesting the establishment of board risk committees for
all companies, limiting them to financial institutions (as originally suggested in the
2009 Walker Review).216 Instead, for all companies, the FRC has inserted a very
general provision in the 2010 UK Corporate Governance Code emphasizing the risk
management responsibilities of the board (C.2),217 supplemented by a requirement
to conduct an annual review of the effectiveness of all risk management controls
(C.2.1).218
The limitation of risk management committees to financial firms is flawed
insofar as it fails to recognize that risk management issues arise routinely at nonfinancial companies, which if sufficiently large or interconnected, can pose a risk to
the economic system as well. Kirkpatrick highlights the fact that risk management is
not unique to financial companies, citing the 2006 example of Airbus which
invested massively in developing the A380 aircraft, a project which involved
substantial exchange rate risk and significant payments to customers in the event of
late delivery.219 Airbus’ board under-estimated these risks and failed to manage
them, such that when significant production delays materialized, Airbus’ directors
were taken by surprise.220 Hence, simply requiring boards of non-financial
214. Peter O. Mülbert & Ryan D. Citlau, The Uncertain Role of Banks’ Corp. Governance in Systemic Risk
Regulation, UNIV. OF MAINZ – CTR. FOR GERMAN AND INT’L LAW OF FIN. SERVS. AND FACULTY, 24 (July 14, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1885866.
215. Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 176.
216. Fin. Reporting Council, supra note 86.
217. See Fin. Reporting Council, supra note 202, at 18 (“The board is responsible for determining the nature
and extent of the significant risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board should
maintain sound risk management and internal control systems.”).
218. See id. (“The board should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the company’s risk
management and internal control systems and should report to shareholders that they have done so. The review
should cover all material controls, including financial, operational and compliance controls.”).
219. Kirkpatrick, supra note 94, at 76.
220. Id.
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companies to implement and review risk management processes, without at least
requiring a minimum core of basic structures, is insufficient. Furthermore, these
reforms fail to tackle head-on the deeper issues of informational loopholes and unintegrated risk management.
Thus, this writer proposes reforms at two levels: i) the inclusion at the
minimum, of separate risk committees chaired by independent CROs, and ii) more
far-reaching reforms involving new structures of “network governance”, to increase
information flows throughout the firm and facilitate the integration of firm-wide
risk management.
The inclusion of separate risk committees chaired by independent CROs can
make a significant difference in firm performance during crises – as the report of
the internationally-constituted Senior Supervisor’s Group shows, firms that fared
best during the crisis were the ones with board oversight of risk in the form of a
high-level committee, which served as a locus for firm-wide monitoring of risks.221
Other empirical studies on the financial crisis have also concurred on the need for
CROs – for example, Bolton found that firms with a CRO enjoyed higher
profitability and suffered fewer loan losses during the crisis.222 A further step may
even involve the recruitment of outside risk-management experts to provide
independent reviews of the adequacy of a firm’s risk-management practices, in the
same way that the audit committee relies on outside accounting firms to review the
company’s financial statements.223 This would ensure that board risk committees
would not solely have to rely on internal “experts”, who may be constrained to deemphasize potentially “bad” news when the firm is making a lot of profit from
undertaking risky activities at a point in time.224
Additionally, risk management needs to be integrated at a firm-wide level. The
primary foundation for integration is better communication and coordination
between the board and other actors in the firm. Accordingly, the channels for
exchange of information need to be improved. One suggestion is to install parallel
communication channels to improve the supply of information to boards.225 As
Pirson and Turnbull point out, this proposal draws from the common-sense insight
that additional communication channels allow for cross-checking and

221. Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Recent Market Turbulence, SENIOR SUPERVISORS
GROUP (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2008/SSG_Risk_Mgt_doc_
final.pdf.
222. Hussein Tarraf, Literature Review on Corp. Governance and the Recent Fin. Crisis, SOC. SCI. RES.
NETWORK (Dec. 27, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1731044.
223. James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk Management in Finance and
Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731, 744–745 (2009).
224. Id.
225. Michael Pirson & Shann Turnbull, Corporate Governance, Risk Management, and the Fin. Crisis: An
Info. Processing View, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 459, 463 (2011).
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supplementation of missing information flows, in the same way that courts require
corroboration of testimony by independent witnesses.226
How would such parallel communication channels be instituted? It is suggested
that a model of network governance be adopted, where the board of directors is
connected to various sub-boards representing various stakeholders in the firm, for
example, an employee assembly and creditor’s council.227 The former would relay
employee-generated information concerning solvency or operational risks to the
firm, while the latter can advise the board on issues pertaining to liquidity, market,
and credit risks.228 While this proposal may seem to involve a radical change to
board structures, it is not without precedent. Hansen and Spitzeck cite evidence
that cooperative banks, some of the few financial institutions to fare well during the
crisis, consistently engaged their workers, suppliers, and customers in the
governance process.229 Further, large companies such as HP and Shell are known to
use stakeholder councils in advisory capacities and to gain strategic “on the ground”
insight into their operations.230
By improving information flows through institutionalizing network governance,
the board moves significantly closer to integrating risk management at a firm-wide
level. With the board receiving multiple sources of information regarding its risk
position, it is then able to generate a quicker and more coordinated firm-wide
response to an increase in its risk profile.231 Also, proper stress-testing can be carried
out on a wider range of scenarios, to identify and pre-empt risks early on.232 Thus
network governance can facilitate the integration of risk management structures
and processes.

D.

Re-invigorating Board Duties: Intensifying and Clarifying Oversight
Responsibilities
Given that US law currently fails to extend a director’s obligation of monitoring to
business risks, an expansion of directorial responsibility is in order. However, in
pitching the standard and scope of this responsibility to monitor risk, one must be
cognizant of the opposing policy consideration that risk management is a young
discipline and that courts must be not seen as imposing liability on directors for a
failure to adopt a specific model of risk management, lest they curb the evolutionary
market processes by which optimal best practices emerge.233

226.
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It is proposed that liability for breach of the duty to monitor risks be pitched at
the standard of gross negligence: i) either utterly failing to implement any risk
management structures or controls,234 or ii) having implemented them, being
grossly negligent in failing to oversee its operations, viz, failing to take note of red
flags raised by the system in place. With respect to ii), the factors taken into account
to determine whether a director is put on notice by a red flag include a) the
potential harm to the company, b) the source of the red flag, and c) the frequency
of the red flag.235 For example, with respect to potential harm, a director’s oversight
responsibility would be more intensely engaged by a red flag regarding a $10 billion
loss, as opposed to a $2 million loss. This would shield directors from liability for
insignificant losses and unlikely risks; and focus directors’ attention on risks that
would put a reasonable director on notice.236 With respect to the source of the red
flag, inside reports showing under-capitalization, over-valuation or over-exposure
to risk would be given more weight than outside sources, for example opinion
pieces written by financial analysts.237 The frequency of the red flag is also a key
indicator – passivity in the face of repeated exposures to a problem is suggestive of
the dereliction of oversight duty. For example, in McCall v Scott,238 Bainbridge notes
that signs of corporate employees’ health care fraud were repeatedly raised to the
board, including audit discrepancies, reports by investigative journalists, and even
criminal investigations in six different states – all of which the board consistently
failed to take into account in discharging its oversight duties.239 Thus, this proposal
aims to encompass management of risks within the scope of directors’ oversight
responsibilities, in order to better safeguard against excessive risk-taking which
threatens systemic stability; yet without placing the standard of care at too high a
level which would be onerous for directors and potentially chill the development of
risk management best practices.

E.

Re-conceiving the Role of Shareholders: From Rights to Responsibilities

Given that the current problem is that of a lack of institutional shareholder
responsibility in encouraging high-risk and short-termist strategies, reforms in the
US geared further towards empowering shareholders, rather than conferring
responsibilities on them, seem to be missing the point. As Bruner notes: “What is
certainly surprising . . . is that policy makers . . . would seek to empower the very

234. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971–72 (Del. Ch. 1996).
235. See Anne Tucker Ness, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability Within the Corporate Power
Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 239–244 (2010) (describing a similar fact intensive test to determine the
existence of red flags in regard to the conscious disregard of director duties.).
236. Id. at 240–41.
237. Id. at 242.
238. 239 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2001).
239. Bainbridge, supra note 178, at 987.
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stakeholder group whose incentives are most skewed toward the kind of excessive
risk-taking that led to the crisis in the first place.”240
One such misconceived reform, as pointed out by various commentators,241 is
the provisions of the US Dodd-Frank Act which promote proxy access for
shareholders in the hopes of encouraging more vigilant monitoring of managers
and prudent risk management - under the SEC Rule 14a-11, shareholders holding
3% of the company’s shares for more than 3 years can now nominate a director and
place this nominee alongside nominees of the incumbent board, which provides a
mechanism for shareholders to put their nominees on the ballot at the expense of
the company, rather than incur the considerable personal expense of conducting a
proxy contest.242 However, given the short-termist and self-interested tendencies of
some institutional shareholders, the Dodd-Frank Act may end up having the
“potentially pernicious effects” of allowing larger shareholders with proxy access to
use the threat of a proxy fight as leverage to extract private benefits form a
corporation – for example, to use the proxy as a “megaphone” for the shareholders’
causes or to pursue idiosyncratic corporate governance changes that may not be
ultimately beneficial for the company.243
Thus, the better approach would be to instil shareholder responsibilities, rather
than expanding shareholder rights. Accordingly, I discuss two proposals to expand
shareholder responsibilities: i) a more “extreme” proposal to confer fiduciary duties
on all activist investors; and ii) a less radical proposal, recently implemented by the
UK FRC, to confer a list of responsibilities on institutional shareholders in a
“Stewardship Code”, backed on a “comply or explain” basis (as is the case with the
current UK Corporate Governance code).244 Ultimately, this writer finds the second
proposal more workable.
The former proposal, as advocated by Anabtawi and Stout,245 would imbue all
shareholders with latent fiduciary duties to the firm and their fellow shareholders;
which would be triggered whenever a particular shareholder – whether or not
formally capable of controlling a board’s decisions through voting rights – manages
to exert an influence on the company’s actions with regard to an issue in which the

240. Christopher M. Bruner, Corp. Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309, 310 (2010).
241. See Paul Rose, Regulating Risk by ‘Strengthening Corporate Governance’, OHIO STATE UNIV., MORITZ
COLLEGE OF LAW, 29 (June 25, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1630122 (describing the Dodd Frank corporate
governance provisions as potentially pernicious and likely to affect little change on investor behavior or risk
management); Martin Lipton et al., A Crisis Is a Terrible Thing to Waste: The Proposed “Shareholder Bill of Rights
Act of 2009” Is a Serious Mistake, 1 (May 12, 2009), http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/
WLRK/WLRK.16657.09.pdf (stating that “the suggested provisions of the [Dodd Frank] Act threaten to
encourage the opposite of its stated goal.”).
242. Rose, supra note 241, at 10.
243. Id. at 20–21.
244. The UK Stewardship Code, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (July 2010), http://www.frc.org.uk/FRCDocuments/FRC/The-UK-Stewardship-Code.aspx.
245. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 186, at 1294–96.
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shareholder has a personal material interest.246 As long as the shareholder’s influence
is a “but for” cause of some corporate transaction or strategy, that would amount to
an exercise of shareholder control.247 Thus, investors with short-term horizons such
as hedge funds, which commonly seek to influence board decisions on ordinary
business decisions, such as the sale of dormant assets or the decrease of capital
expenditures,248 would be obligated to consider the interests of all other stakeholders
and shareholders in the firm. While this proposal is admirable in principle, as it
aims at protecting long-term corporate value and the interests of the financial
system and wider economy, it would open the door to increased litigation over the
highly indefinite meaning of shareholder “control” or “influence”; and is a recipe
for disastrous shareholder to shareholder litigation over potentially any issue in
which various blocks of shareholders do not agree.
A more acceptable solution to conferring responsibilities on institutional
shareholders would be the UK Stewardship Code, a proposal first initiated by the
UK Institutional Shareholders’ Committee and supported by the 2009 Walker
Review.249 The code endows institutional investors with certain governance
responsibilities, in the interest of improving long-term returns to shareholders and
wider benefits to stakeholders, as well as reducing the risk of catastrophic outcomes
to the system.250 For example, Principle 4 states that “[i]nstitutional investors should
establish clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate their activities as a
method of protecting and enhancing shareholder value.”251 In the supporting
guidance, instances where escalation and intervention are suggested include “risks
arising from social and environmental matters.”252 Thus, the Stewardship Code
encourages institutional investors to adopt a systemically-sustainable approach to
investing, and to be accountable to all corporate stakeholders in the exercise of their
voting powers. Further, unlike the previous proposal to impose duties on all activist
shareholders, enforceable via litigation, the Stewardship Code is premised on a less
onerous and more flexible “comply or explain” model, such that smaller
institutional investors which are unable to, for example, report to companies on
their voting activities (Principle 7) as regularly as bigger institutions, would not be
forced to “comply” but can “explain” why their resources may constrain their
ability to carry out their stewardship obligations.253 As Heineman suggests, the US
should seriously consider adopting a similar proposal: “[The Stewardship Code] is

246. Id.
247. Id. at 1295.
248. Grossman, supra note 45, at 26.
249. Ben W. Heineman, A Stewardship Code for Inst. Investors, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 19, 2010),
available at http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/jan2010/ca20100119_228745.htm.
250. Fin. Reporting Council, supra note 244, at 1.
251. Id. at 7.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1–2, 9.
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the most detailed attempt to date to give institutional and regulatory form to the
belief that shareholders are part of the solution, not part of the problem, and that
they have not just a right, but a duty, to engage with the companies in which they
invest.”254

Conclusion
The advent of the global financial crisis has challenged our ideas of corporate
governance. Specifically, it has forced us to re-think whether we are content with a
paradigm of corporate governance which serves solely the interests of shareholders,
or also the interests of the system that the corporate is embedded in. Accordingly,
we are also compelled to re-think whether our current corporate governance
mechanisms are apt to achieve these wider goals of systemic stability.
While much of the current legal literature on post-crisis corporate governance
does include proposals for reform, there is yet to be a study that begins from first
principles to re-think the foundational purposes of corporate governance, and
logically flowing from that, the means to achieve these purposes. This paper has
attempted to do so by positing and defending a systemic stakeholder model for all
public listed companies, where the interests of the economy and financial system
are to be taken into account such companies. Flowing from this understanding of
the ends of corporate governance, it has been argued that fundamental changes
must be introduced to re-compose and re-structure the board, while increasing
duties and responsibilities for directors and institutional shareholders. Collectively,
the roles of directors and shareholders should be re-conceptualized as stewards for
the system’s stake in the company. It is the hope of this writer that this provides a
coherent paradigm, or at least the germ of an idea, for the revision of AngloAmerican corporate governance in the wake of the financial crisis.
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